HUMAN NATURE AND TRAINING FOR LAW
PRACTICE *
WiLBEn G. KATZ t

S ocial

and Humanistic Problems in Professional Education is the
topic set for this morning's discussion. I think it is significant, however, that we got deep into this subject yesterday. At least in law,
medicine, and theology we found it impossible to discuss problems of
method in even the strictly professional subjects without considering
the broader professional objectives. And if business and engineering
seemed to be exceptions, I think this was only because of the examples
used by the speakers in presenting the problem methods used in those
fields. If, for example, trade-associatiqn activities had been discussed
as a problem in business education or if we had considered the function
of the engineer in a utility rate case, we should have seen that in all
fields questions of method in strictly professional education raise social
and humanistic problems.
At the sessions yesterday I was struck with the hesitant or frankly pessimistic way in which lawyers spoke of the problem of training for
policy judgments. One way, it seems to me, in which a law school may
promote such training indirectly is by having an active program of research on important problems of public policy. I am thinking of research such as that of Eugene V. Rostow at Yale on national policy for
the oil industry, and projects such as those under way at Chicago., There
Walter J. Blum, a law teacher, and Norman Bursler, an economist on
the law faculty, have made a critical study of tax proposals affecting the
supply of rental housing. Restrictive labor practices in the housing field
and building codes have also been studied, and two of our faculty
worked on a brief filed by them as friends of the Court in the racial restrictive covenant cases. Many of the students can take part in such
projects, and for the entire student body the research projects are part
of the effective climate in which their professional work is studied.
And speaking of research, I want to comment on the microscopically
small fraction of law-school funds which are devoted to research. We
of the law schools have not educated either our university administrators or the legal profession to expect that the law schools should be
centers of criticism and advance of the law and its administration, and
* Speech given at the Inter-Professions Conference on Education for Professional
Responsibility at the session on "Social and Humanistic Problems in Professional
Education," April 14, 1948.
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to furnish the funds necessary for such activity. You of the medical
schools, at least, would be shocked if you saw our budgets; if you agree
that law has something to do with public welfare, you might even be
shocked into helping us obtain an appropriate share of funds available
for research.
While it is difficult to give all law students a part in actual research
projects related to important questions of policy, it is possible to give
them at least an introduction to what such research involves. We make
an attempt to do this in our required course in Industrial Organization.
We are able to do so only because we have as full-time members of the
law-school faculty two kinds of economists. One of these is an economic theorist, who presents the theory of competition and monopoly
as a background for study of legal institutions appropriate for promotion
of what Dr. Calkins I called. "responsible management of economic
affairs." Each student is required to study organization and distribution problems of a particular industry, and the other economists are
available for tutorial guidance and criticism of these studies.
But. education in relation to policy encounters difficulties far deeper
than those which have thus far been indicated. Experience shows that
our students need insight into the process of value judgment. Policy
discussion, in law schools as elsewhere, is crippled by the prevalence of
two attitudes toward questions of value or policy. The first of these
is the attitude which Dr. Greene? has called that of the "dogmatic relativist." Here values are regarded as purely a matter of individual and
class desires; criteria of value independent of the preference of the
valuer are asserted to be meaningless. Equally troublesome for education in matters of policy are the students who reject moral relativism
but who are naively emotional in their invoking of criteria of justice.
Some law teachers have been so plagued with such students that in
desperation they rule the concept of justice out of order in their classes.
I remember well the retort with which Dean Pound tried to silence one
of my protesting classmates: "This is a law school, Mr. Smith; if you're
worried about justice, you'd better transfer to the divinity school I"
We are not here concerned with the orig in of these attitudes in our
students. .The convictions.of the dogmatic relativists may be the result of implications which they have -drawn, rightly or wrongly,, from
the science teaching to .which they have been exposed. They may result, as C. S. Lewis has argued in The Abolition of ian., from the attitudes of relativists under-.whom they have studied 4iterature. And as
I Robert D. Calkins, Vice-President and Director, Generail Education Board, New
York City, who spoke on the "Aims of-Businesg Education."
2Theodore M. Greene, Professor of Philosophy, Yale University.
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for the students who are warmly concerned about justice, the naive
quality of their expressions may result from their feeling on the defensive, self-conscious in rebellion against a position widely thought to
have behind it the prestige of science. But whatever the causes, we
must agree with President Rogers 3 that few students come from college
with values which they are able to explain or defend.
I have said that our students need to gain insight into the process of
value judgment. Of course they acquire much from observing the attitude and approach of law teachers who believe that law is not just the
will of the dominant class, and who have respect for the craft of the
law. But for this generation of law students more is necessary if they
are to be started on the development of a coherent moral and political
philosophy.
For this purpose we have found a valuable body of' material in the
writings of psychoanalysts. For the days are over when the contributions of medical psychology to the theory of morality are solely in the
unmasking of rationalizations and the debunking of values. Psychiatrists in increasing numbers are saying something positive about the
nature of man, something relevant to moral and legal problems. What
they are saying has its relation, of course, to the discussion of the nature
of man in traditional moral philosophy. But students of today will
more easily face philosophical questions concerning human nature if
they discover the questions as they are suggested in clinical material.
In this connection, we have been experimenting with having our law
students read and discuss books such as Ranyard West's Conscience and
Society, Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom and -Manfor Himself,
Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents, and papers such as Robert P.
Knight's "Determinism, 'Freedom,' and Psychotherapy." '
In varying terms these writers discuss the peculiar characteristic of
man-his potentiality of growth, his capacity to mature. They describe
the direction of possible growth in terms such as emotional maturity,
mental health, freedom, productiveness. They show that inter-personal
relations are the tests of a man's development, tests which reveal the
degree of his capacity to love.
Such writers also discuss the factors which obstruct the achievement
of maturity, external and internal factors which give rise to tendencies
to retreat from maturity, to shrink from the freedom which is possible.
These tendencies are traced to experiences of childhood, experiences
3 Barry S. Rogers, President, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, who spoke on
"Gaps Between Statement and Achievement of Objectives in the Education of the
UEngineer."
4 9 PsycmAny 251 (1946).
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which were threatening or which appeared to be so. The realization of
man's potentialities is therefore a matter of the overcoming or transcending of these stubborn tendencies.
Let me suggest some of the implications of this view of the nature of
man, implications significant for the understanding of law and for the
work of lawyers.
In the first place, the concept of maturity or freedom is explicitly a
concept of the good for man, the objective of his development. For
Dr. Knight, in the paper referred to above, freedom is the feeling which
comes with action in accordance with law which has been willingly accepted-action under "acceptable inner compulsion." He is clear, however, that the good for man is not conformity to the mores, not even
obedience to all laws and decrees. It means rather "willing acceptance
of laws providing basic justice and opportunity to all men, with the
right to oppose those decrees which are inconsistent with basic justice
in human relationships." "The essence of the actuality of freedom"
is to be found in "a continuous revolution toward better possibilities
of freedom for all men." 5
Here is a doctor's answer to the old question, "What is justice?,"
which Dr. Homer Smith " addressed to Professor Fuller yesterday. It
is a psychological statement of the traditional doctrine of natural lawof moral law known through knowledge of the nature of man, a doctrine of justice as a criterion by which laws may be judged.
There are implications for the law also in the psychiatrist's analysis
of the tendencies which block man's progress toward freedom. In
Conscience and Society, Dr. West finds in these tendencies the basic
need for law. His fundamental point is that law and organized force
are necessary, not for an anti-social minority, but for all of us. With
psychiatric case material he outlines the "vagaries of the aggressive impulses" which make law necessary. He explains the formation of misconceptions and fantasies in infancy, the operation of repression in preventing the correction of infantile misconceptions by later experience,
and the way in which hostility on the part of other people is imagined
or magnified by identification with a fantasy figure from infancy or
by projection of one's own repressed hostility. "The characteristic
manifestations of the aggressive instinct

.

.

.

combine with those

fixed prejudices of the mind of normal man which render him incapable
of executing equity in his own cause to constitute him always and essentially a potential law breaker." It is only with the aid of law that the
5 Id. at 257-258.

6 Professor of Physiology, New York University, who spoke on "Objectives and
Objectivity in Science."
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anything like a satisfactory balance with
is for the average man; it operates as an
For a democracy, "The law should at
average man, and be for his control."

Writings such as these, furthermore, yield insight into the nature of
moral, and therefore of legal, responsibility. For example, Dr. Knight
in his paper speaks of man's power "to conceive of himself as different,
better, happier, more successful," his power "to reshape the very causal
factors which hamper his growth." But the reshaping of internal causal
factors is painful and requires effort, whether in ordinary life or in a
course of psychotherapy. It is in the making of this effort, the enduring
of this pain, that moral activity takes place.
Theologians have often struggled with the paradoxical quality of
man's freedom, and Dr. Knight reveals an analogous paradox. As a
scientist he studies human conduct on the hypothesis of complete determinism, but admits that progress toward psychic health does not take
place without effort-and effort which it is not satisfactory to explain
in deterministic terms. It may be disappointing to law students to find
no simpler basis for human responsibility, but it is important that they
be no longer protected from the metaphysical facts of life.
I have said that medical psychology has significance not only for the
understanding of law but for the work of lawyers. Let me give one
example. Dr. West traces the need for law to the marked capacity of
human beings to form and retain prejudices, a capacity which makes
man a notoriously poor judge in his own case. In other words, the selfdeceptiveness and unreliability of man in moral activity makes law
necessary, since moral activity is, of course, precisely the acting as judge
in one's own case.
In this connection the position of the lawyer is curiously-and constructively-ambiguous. The practicing lawyer is primarily an advocate, and his loyalty is to his client. This loyalty means that his job is
not that of judging his client nor the justice of the client's cause. Confidence in the law rests not only on the impartiality of judges and juries,
but also on the loyal partiality of professional advocates. But this is
only half the picture. It is not inconsistent with a view of loyal advocacy that the lawyer should often try to bring his client to a more objective appraisal of his situation. " Indeed it is because of his client's confidence in his loyal partiality that the lawyer can sometimes enable the
client to become to some extent an impartial judge of his own cause.
I have been giving illustrations of the light thrown by medical psychologists upon the problem of values in relation to law. I have said
that we find the reading and discussion of writings of these scientists an
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effective method of stimulating students to face basic questions in moral
philosophy. I should add that the writings of psychiatrists are not the
exclusive fare in the reading course I have described. During the current year they are read together with Plato's Gorgias, Dewey's Human
Nature and Conduct, and two works in cultural anthropology. It has
been our experience that such books are read and discussed with more
comprehension and respect in the light of the clinical material.

